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Summary
In this article the author analyses the anti-corruption policy in Croatia as part 
of a wider awareness-rising process in transition countries. After the collapse 
of Communism, corruption spread quickly in post-Communist countries as a 
result of exogenous factors such as the export of corruption by the most de-
veloped countries seeking to find new markets, and endogenous factors such 
as hasty privatization and the creation of new political elites caught in the 
web of various conflicts of interest. In Croatia the situation was exacerbated 
by the war itself and war speculations and profiteering, followed by a corrup-
tive privatization and lack of anti-corruption standards in the political culture 
of the country. Croatia had to adopt, on its way to European Union member-
ship, a set of concrete measures countering the spreading of political corrup-
tion throughout the society. An important role was, thus, played by European 
Union conditionality requesting an integral approach to the pathological phe-
nomenon of corruption. The author argues that such an integral approach has 
not yet been achieved due to the reduction of political corruption mostly to 
bribe and graft, while more sophisticated forms of political corruption have 
not been tackled yet, such as party clientelism, cronyism, electoral fraud and 
trading in influence. Therefore the author invokes the results of a compre-
hensive approach to political corruption as done by contemporary political 
science in the world, and advocates the formulation of a comprehensive anti-
-corruption code that would eliminate the dispersion of anti-corruptive legis-
lation in numerous acts and redundancy that obfuscate the action of political 
actors in combating corruption. Here the role of the European Union is tanta-
mount because it sets very tough standards based on a wide investigation of 
political corruption in Croatia at all levels, especially in the highest echalons 
of political life. An anti-corruption strategy as well as concrete action plans 
in combating corruption became part of the benchmarks, a third generation 
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conditionality standards elaborated by the EU, and Croatia had to comply 
to them and build the society’s capacity to deal with political corruption in a 
more efficient way, thus eliminating ambiguity and hesitancy that could harm 
the political actors in power.
Keywords: political corruption, anti-corruption measures, anti-corruption stra-
tegy, integral approach to corruption, forms of political pathology, anti-corrup-
tion laws, European Union conditionality, EU benchmarks
1. The Anti-corruption Decade: 1990-2000
Political corruption is a malignant disease that affects all political communities and 
all political systems. All forms of political authority, without exception, are liable 
to political corruption. In this sense, political corruption means the decay and cor-
rosion of political authority and political power itself. This is the significance of 
political corruption as used in classic political thought, e.g. in Machiavelli, Mon-
tesquieu, as well as Gibbon, in his discourses on the main causes of the decline and 
fall of the Roman Empire. In modern political thought, this concept loses its mo-
ralistic connotations and means primarily the decay and deterioration of political 
institutions and the appearance of a corrupted government (Klitgaard, 1988; Alatas, 
1990; Heywood, 1997).
While totalitarian political systems are corruptive by definition, since the mis-
use of power is built in the very foundations of arbitrary power without constraints, 
in democratic polities political corruption appears as one of the forms of pathology 
of the political process. Not the only one, since pathologies of democracy can be 
classified into six categories:
– first, political demagogy, i.e. the misuse of political communication for the 
sake of preserving power by appealing to the populace or to the basic fears 
and emotions of the public;1
– second, political hypocrisy, i.e. the discrepancy between political goals and 
values as expressed in pre-election and programmatic documents (such as 
constitutions) and the reality of power-policy or political realism;2
1 Although the discourse on political demagogy does not fall within the aim of this work, it is 
important to note that this important form of political pathology was widely treated by classics in 
political thought such as Plato, Alexis De Tocqueville, Leo Strauss and Hannah Arendt, and most 
recently by Drew Westen (2008), Bryan Garsten (2009), and Michael Signer (2009). According 
to them, demagogy is a dangerous by-product of democracy, and humanity’s urge to liberty can 
give rise to dark forces that threaten that very freedom.
2 Again, this topic can be traced in classic political works such as those by Thomas Hobbes, 
Bernard De Mandeville, Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, Niccolo’ Machiavelli and Jean-
-Jacques Rousseau, as mentioned in: Runciman, 2010, and Grant, 1999.
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– third, political manipulation, as the intentional activity to engage, control, 
or influence the body politic in order to direct its behaviour toward a spe-
cific action;3
– fourth, political corruption, as the misuse of political power for personal 
or partial political interests (Nye, 1967; Heywood, 1997; Heidenhammer, 
1978; Heidenhammer, Johnston, LeVine, 1990);
– fifth, political paranoia, as the systemic use of fear (of conspiracies, ene-
mies, traitors or other threats) in order to preserve power and scale down 
opposition4 and
– sixth, political violence, as the ultimate means to preserve power by escalat-
ing the political conflict into open enmities with violence, i.e. the unlawful 
use of force or violent acts against the political opponent in order to coerce 
or intimidate the opposition or the civilian population in furtherance of po-
litical and social objectives.5
All these forms of political pathology become visible when democratic sys-
tems are no longer compared to totalitarian systems, as occurred after 1989, i.e. 
after the collapse of the Soviet communist system and its East-European variants. 
It is, therefore, understandable that these forms of pathology attract more atten-
tion, since they become the measure of democracy in a country, especially in new 
democratic polities, i.e. in transition countries, in which all these forms are more 
transparent – ranging from nationalist demagogy to political violence in the form of 
ethnic and other wars.
Among these forms of pathology, political corruption is becoming a global phe-
nomenon. This is not to say that corruption had not been present in any particular so-
ciety: however, globalization made it visible on the global scale, affecting the whole 
world. Besides globalization and its effects, the second factor that made corruption 
visible is the advancement of information technology: the business of government is 
no longer secretive, as it used to be in the past. Information and the circulation there-
3 Political manipulation is a recurrent theme in political thought since the genre Specula prin-
cipi in the Middle Ages and Machiavelli’s advices to the ruler, but in modern politics and de-
mocracies the topic was widely researched by William Riker (1986), Philip Steele (2005), and 
Nikolaos Zahariadis (2005).
4 Political paranoia is usually associated with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but impor-
tant research on the use of political paranoia in democracies was done by Robert Robbins and 
Jarold Post (1997), Joan D’Arc and Al Hidell (2010), and Frank Furedi (2005).
5 Common wisdom would tend to oppose democracy to political violence, but how political 
violence is becoming a constituent component of modern democracies is well demonstrated by 
John Keane (2004), Charles Tilly (2003), and the already classic work in political thought by G. 
Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (1984).
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of is the basic prerequisite of managing modern societies: more and more informa-
tion become public domain and the arcana imperii – the secrets of the art of govern-
ing – cannot remain concealed within the political elites. The third factor, the “end 
of history” (the victory over Soviet communism) has brought to surface new pushes 
toward increased democratization and public participation in the running of public 
affairs. The concurrence of the three factors has led to the unveiling of corruption as 
the most dangerous form of political pathology in modern democracies.
However, it was the World Bank that launched in 1993 the first global an-
ti-corruption program, after it was found that world costs of corruption in busi-
ness amounted to more than three trillion US Dollars; that old democracies and 
the most developed countries tolerated political corruption of foreign political of-
ficials (those in developing countries as well as in transition countries); and that 
these costs were acknowledged as a special tax deduction for “corruption costs” 
abroad, which meant a via facti legalization of domestic corruptors when they oper-
ate abroad. Generally speaking, 10 per cent of the world’s GNP was spent on cor-
ruption, ranging from a low percentage in developed countries (cca. 1-3 per cent) 
up to 20 per cent in the poorest and transition countries. This average value of 10 
percent is precisely the figure of the costs of corruption in Croatia, as per the Free-
dom House Report in 2009.
Consequently, in the 1990s consistent effort was made to curb corruption in the 
globalized economy, namely in the most developed countries, both economically 
and politically. The World Bank labelled such countries as exporters of corruption 
into the Third World and transition countries. On the other hand, the citizens of the 
most developed countries had themselves been protected from the pathology of 
corruption. This was a blatant paradox: while developing an anti-corruption culture 
within their own democratic societies, the most developed countries tolerated the 
corruption of Third World and transition countries’ officials, in order to foster their 
own economic and political interests. Still, this gap in double-standards appeared to 
be not only a factor of faster development (as Huntington argues), but ultimately it 
fired back as a boomerang, raising the costs of international transactions and creat-
ing a world-wide discomfort. 
Consequently, significant anti-corruption measures and instruments have been 
launched on the international level. In the most developed democratic countries, 
standards of anti-corruption policies have been raised, and protective mechanisms 
have been built for the reduction of corruption and an efficient prevention and cura-
tive action in two fields: in international political and economic transactions, and in 
the field of political culture and awareness about the danger of corruption.
Throughout the 1990s, there was a series of activities of international organiza-
tions, governmental as well as non-governmental: in 1991, the Resolution against 
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Corruption of the General Assembly of the UN was adopted. In 1993, the overarch-
ing World Programme for the Fight of Corruption of the World Bank was launched. 
In 1995, the European Parliament passed the Resolution on Combating Corruption 
in Europe. In 1996, the UN adopted the International Code of Conduct for Public 
Officials, and next year its General Assembly voted a resolution entitled Action 
against Corruption. Also in 1997, the Council of Europe adopted the Model Code 
of Behaviour for Public Officials, paving the way for the document entitled Twenty 
Recommendations against Corruption; the European Union formulated the Con-
vention on the Fight against Corruption Applying to Officials of the European Com-
munities and Officials of Member-states; the European Commission sent a Com-
munication to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament 
on the Need to Formulate an EU Policy against Corruption; and the OECD passed 
the Convention on the Fight Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions. In 1999, the Council of Europe passed the Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption, immediately followed by the Criminal Law Convention 
on Corruption; in the same year, GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) was 
founded within the Council of Europe. Finally, in the year 2000, at the end of this 
“Anti-corruption decade”, the UN adopted the Convention against Transnationally 
Organized Crime, crowning the escalation from the first steps of fight against bri-
bery conducing to a general offensive against international crime.
The wave of anti-corruption activities spread to the international civil society 
after 1993, when the international non-governmental organization Transparency In-
ternational was founded, which published in 1995 its Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). In those years, other international organizations, networks and think-tanks 
against corruption were established, such as the Global Forum for the Fight against 
Corruption, UNICORN – the Global Trade-unions Anti-corruption Network, the 
Internet Center for Corruption Research, ACN – the Anticorruption Network for 
Transition Economies, the World Anticorruption Network, the World Anticorrup-
tion Knowledge Center, an organization named Global Report on Integrity, along-
side with numerous institutes and centers for corruption and transnational crime 
research, as well as numerous watchdogs, monitoring centers, university centers, 
independent think-tanks and other non-governmental organizations on the interna-
tional, regional or national basis.
2. Fight Against Political Corruption as EU Accession Conditionality
The European Union encountered the problem of corruption and political corrup-
tion during the accession process of the ten transition countries to the European 
Union. Despite the fact that the Copenhagen criteria established preclusive mem-
bership standards (the political criteria of which implied the functioning of demo-
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cracy and democratic institutions, respect for the principles of the state of law, de-
mocratic elections and multi-party democracy), it came out that these criteria do not 
encompass an efficient struggle to eliminate political corruption from the political 
processes in those countries. Precisely because political corruption is an underhand, 
perfidious enemy which coexists with the democratic facade of the political system, 
and, moreover, is difficult to unveil when it is not manifest in the most primitive 
form – as bribery – it became clear that the Copenhagen criteria were not sufficient 
for the preparation of the candidate-states for EU membership.
In 1998, in its evaluation of the Central and East European countries’ request 
for EU membership, within the scope of preparation for the Agenda 2000, the Eu-
ropean Commission concluded that in those countries, the fight against political 
corruption must be upgraded. The Commission’s report on the progress of each 
candidate-country can be summed up as follows: “The efforts undertaken by candi-
date-countries are not always adequate to the entity of the problem itself. Although 
some of these countries initiate new programs for the control and prevention of cor-
ruption, it is too early for a judgment on the efficiency of such measures. A lack of 
determination can be seen in confronting this problem and in rooting out corruption 
in the greatest part of the candidate-countries.” Similar estimations were repeated 
in subsequent reports on the progress of candidate-countries from Central and East 
Europe. Accordingly, it was concluded in 2001 that political corruption is a serious 
problem in five out of ten countries of Central and East Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), and a constant problem in three coun-
tries (Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia). The Commission refrained from expressing 
critical remarks only in the case of two countries – Estonia and Slovenia.
However, in the meantime the European Union had to deal with the pheno-
menon of political corruption within its own ranks. Not to mention the collective 
demise of the European Commission in 1999 because of corruption, the EU had to 
deal with mounting political corruption within its member-states. Up to 2002, only 
eight out of fifteen member-states ratified the basic instrument that EU adopted 
against corruption, namely the EU Convention on the Safeguarding of Economic In-
terests of the European Communities. Some of the founding-members of the Euro-
pean Community were rated as countries with a “high level of corruption” – namely 
Germany, France and, specifically, Italy. It was stated that some of the candidate-
-countries were less corrupted then the three above-mentioned founding states of 
the EC (Estonia and Slovenia were indicated as a positive example).
Although the situation somewhat improved until the final accession of Central 
and East European countries to the EU in 2004, as stated in the yearly progress re-
ports (Country Progress Report), in two cases a “systemic corruption” was detect-
ed. Such tough judgment requested the formulation of additional, clear and unam-
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biguous criteria for dealing with the problem. This was the case with Romania and 
Bulgaria, which were accepted into EU membership only in 2007, but with a sus-
pensive clause incorporated in their accession treaties, enabling the EU to freeze at 
any moment the membership status of each of these two countries. Moreover, pre-
accession monitoring was extended beyond the critical juncture of accession, pav-
ing the way for a new precedent in EU politics – the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism. This mechanism will, clearly, become operational in other cases during 
the next waves of enlargement, with a high probability of applying it to countries 
from the Western Balkans area.
Consequently, it was d’oblige that the EU should develop new tools for meas-
uring and evaluating corruption in candidate-countries beyond the Fifth Enlarge-
ment. Additional criteria were, thus, applied to countries pertaining to the second 
generation of European agreements, namely, countries whose relations with the EU 
and their eventual EU membership prospective was set by the Stabilization and Ac-
cession Agreements – i.e. the Western Balkans countries. But since the EU agreed at 
the Thessaloniki summit in 2003 that the progress of each South-eastern applicant 
country will be judged on an individual basis, it was necessary to formulate and 
elaborate special criteria, tailored to each country and to the specific nature of cor-
ruption developed in it. Thus Croatia, which acquired candidate status in 2005, had 
to fulfil a new set of requests in addition to the Copenhagen and Madrid accession 
criteria (political, economic and legal accompanied by the administrative criteria) – 
requests imposed by the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU 
and Croatia signed in 2001. They included elimination of the consequences of war, 
full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, prosecution of do-
mestic war criminals, the return of refugees, establishment of regional cooperation, 
etc. At the opening of each of the 33 negotiation chapters (35 in all), Croatia re-
ceived additional benchmarks, including, as a special benchmark in the fight against 
corruption, the urgent need to adopt an overall anti-corruption program and strategy 
for combating corruption. This was necessary due to the fact that Croatia was ca-
tegorized among countries with high, systemic corruption that requests very elabo-
rate and constant measures to root it out from the society and the Croatian polity.
3. Political Corruption in Croatia
Political corruption as a pathological political phenomenon was recognized in 
Croatia only after the year 2000, despite the fact that research on corruption in tran-
sitional Croatia was undertaken already in 1994 (Grubiša, 1995), and the first com-
prehensive analyses and studies on corruption appeared between 1999 and 2001 
(Kregar, 1999; Petričić, 2000; Derenčinović, 2001). The measurement of the per-
ception of corruption in Croatia according to the Transparency International crite-
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ria started in 1999, and Croatia was placed 74th on a list of 105 countries (the least 
corrupted country being placed first, and the most corrupted 105th). Undoubtedly, 
such ranking meant that corruption in Croatia was estimated to be very high, among 
countries that earned the appelative of countries of endemic corruption, on the way 
to the tougher qualification of “systemic corruption”. Therefore, the perception of 
Croatia at the time (this was the period of the authoritarian nationalist regime led by 
President Franjo Tudjman) was undoubtedly very unfavourable as far as democratic 
control and efficiency of the fight against of corruption were concerned. Since then, 
Croatia’s ranking oscillated, reaching the peak in 2003 (in the last year of the Račan 
coalition, center-left government) as 51st on the scale, while in 2009 it fell back to 
the 66th place.
The situation in Croatia differed from the situation in other transition countries. 
The political and social development was highly polluted with the effects of the war 
and the authoritarian post-communist, nationalist regime established after the col-
lapse of the Yugoslav model of self-managing socialism. Therefore, the causes of 
the rampant corruption in Croatia could be connected to a series of circumstances. 
Those causes are specific and make up the “peculiarity of the model” (Grubiša, 
2005). They can be summarized in six major points:
First, the legacy of the “old system”, or as the Croatian Bishops Conference’s 
commission Iustitia et pax put it, the communist mentality and traditional corrup-
tion culture. The Yugoslav self-managing socialism, as a mild form of communism, 
with strong party control despite of a market economy, was functioning parallel 
with state-dirigism. It favoured some forms of petty corruption, or “street-level cor-
ruption”, also known in the theory of corruption as “bakshish” and “shirini” cor-
ruption (bakshish standing for “tips”, and shirini, a Persian word, standing for “gift 
of convenience”, or “sign of attention”). Besides that, the non-functioning of the 
market economy and red-tape favoured short-cuts in order to obtain service from 
local and state bureaucracy. Political corruption was embodied in party nepotism 
and cronyism, since the “cadre policy”, i.e. the selection of officials at all levels was 
domaine reservé of the League of Communists. Exceptions in some elections were 
mere confirmations of the rule (due to the proliferation of all levels of voting in the 
so-called self-managing democratic process).
Second, corruption was induced by the war itself: during the war, owing to 
the arms embargo imposed by the UN, it was difficult to purchase armaments for 
the defense, and war procurement was, obviously, neither transparent nor demo-
cratic. Members of the new anti-communist political elite were involved in illicit 
arms trade, smuggling funds for the defense, with the result that a certain number 
of Croatian war veterans happened to accumulate consistent fortunes. After the war, 
they became the first “tycoons”, among them many generals who had already dur-
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ing the war started to be implicated in illegal trade, even with the enemy, or embezz-
ling money and funds for the defense. The most notorious example was general 
Vladimir Zagorec, a modest technician before the war, who was sentenced to prison 
for embezzling funds for the defense. Other generals or high-ranking officials ac-
cumulated consistent wealth, and since it was done as an expression of the “spoils 
system”, their behaviour favoured the spread of corruption even at lower levels.
The third cause of political corruption was, obviously, the non-transparent 
process of privatization of state-owned enterprises. These enterprises were not sold 
to offerers at the best price, but to politically suitable (politically fit) clients from 
the ruling political elite, followers of the nationalist party in power. Part of the state-
-owned properties was distributed among the war veterans, thus creating a privi-
leged class, spreading the notion that appartenance to the ruling elite can be a source 
of enrichment, incited by the example given from the top (purchase of socially-
-owned apartments at irrisory prices, factories given away at irrisory prices and 
with extremely advantageous loans, etc.) (Petričić, 2000; Kregar, 1999).
The fourth cause lies in the new political culture of the “nationalist revolu-
tion”, i.e. the concept of the state itself. It may sound strange that we introduce here 
an ideological argument, but the truth is that the entire war was fought not only to 
defend the country from Milošević and the Serbian aggression, but also to build a 
strong nationalist state as the embodiment of the Croatian national spirit. Obviously, 
such a state, as the ultimate ideal of the national and political ambitions, was not 
the post-modern state model, but the nineteenth-century model of national state as 
a symbol of national power, and certainly not a state as an instrument for the well-
being (and security) of its inhabitants. Instead of the model of a modern service-pro-
vider state (servant to its citizens), the state that was inaugurated was the ultimate 
symbol of national strength and power. Such a concept of state, with its ideological 
burden, enabled the creation of a state apparatus that was beyond questionability. 
The fifth cause is derived precisely from the fourth one, i.e. from the concept 
of state. A massive bureaucracy was created founded on the spoils system. The pub-
lic administration, ostentatively called “state administration”, was filled with party 
acolytes and followers: two thirds of the 65.000 employees in the administration at 
the central level were selected without public competitions, solely on the base of 
their loyalty to the nationalist elite that ruled from 1990 to 2000 (with the brief in-
termezzo of a national-unity war government from August 1991 to May 1992), and 
again from 2003 to the present. Obviously, such an administration is not inclined 
towards any reform or rationalization of the bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, it 
does not serve the public, but the state as the imaginary embodiment of the “nation-
al will”, “national spirit” and the “thousand-year-long historical aspiration and goal 
of the Croatian nation”. The fifth cause can thus be termed hyper-bureaucratization, 
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i.e. inflation of state officials that get their job not according to the rational needs 
of administering the state, but rather as a prize for their political loyalty nurturing 
the representativeness of the state and its symbols – and bureaucracy is one of the 
major among them.
The sixth cause is a logical result of such a concept, namely hyper-normati-
vism that is derived from a power-centered state, which is not a service-provider to 
the public. Hyper-normativism is embodied in numerous and detailed laws regulat-
ing all aspects of social and political life, albeit the main legal acts regulating and 
punishing corruption are lacking: and here we speak about the lack of a basic legal 
document on the conflict of interest, of political campaigns and party financing, of a 
comprehensive anti-corruption legislature – all of these passed in 2011 only as part 
of EU conditionality, not on the initiative of the society itself (despite the continu-
ous efforts made by the opposition, and hindered by the governing majority). 
Only after the collapse of the nationalist government and the death of Franjo 
Tudjman was it possible to open a dialogue on political corruption in Croatian so-
ciety. In 2002, the Croatian parliament passed the first National Program for Com-
bating Corruption, proposed by the center-left coalition led by Prime Minister Ivica 
Račan. The first specialized body enabled to fight corruption, USKOK (Office for 
Combating Corruption and Organized Crime), was established in 2001. But after 
the return of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to power in November 2003, 
the political initiative on countering corruption went into stagnation and Croatia 
was again on its way down the international scale of corruption perception (Cor-
ruption Perception Index – CPI), but also according to other indicators: the year-
ly reports of the international non-governmental organization Freedom House, the 
Global Governance Index, the Index of Democracy of the Swedish Institute for De-
mocracy and the British The Economist Intelligence Unit.
The political discourse on corruption was reinvigorated in 2006 when Croatia 
initiated the negotiation process regarding EU accession. One of the additional cri-
teria for fulfilling membership requirements was the benchmark requesting the 
elaboration of an anti-corruption strategy, since political corruption was marked as 
a serious problem that could hamper the harmonization of the Croatian legal and 
political system with the European legal and political acquis. Consequently, Croatia 
was compelled to formulate its own anti-corruption strategy as one of the precon-
ditions for starting the accession negotiations. The National Program for the Fight 
against Corruption was thus adopted by the Croatian Parliament in the spring of 
2006.
One year later, the European Commission issued its Screening Report stating 
that, despite the fact that the National Anti-corruption Program was passed, cor-
ruption still represented a serious problem in Croatia and significantly influenced 
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various aspects of social life. The general attitude of the authorities in Croatia was 
labelled as reactive instead of being proactive. The general toleration of “petty cor-
ruption” – bribery – is a cause for concern, and corruption is sustained by the lack 
of good administration, transparency and accountability in public administration, as 
well as the lack of ethical codes and codes of conduct in both the public and private 
sectors.
This opinion from the 2007 Screening Report was later repeated in the Euro-
pean Commission Progress Report of the same year. It is stated therein that the im-
plementation of the anti-corruption program has not proceeded past the initial stage. 
According to the standpoint of the European Commission, a complete implemen-
tation of the program was urgently necessary, as well as a strong political will that 
was lacking in order to strengthen the efforts, especially when corruption at the high 
political level was concerned. Not only was it necessary to invest more effort into 
pro-active prevention, unveiling and efficient prosecution of corruption, but more-
over it was imperative to raise the awareness of corruption as a serious criminal act. 
Despite the findings of USKOK, corruption remains a serious problem, many alle-
gations for corruption remain uninvestigated, and corruptive behaviour usually fails 
to be punished. All too frequently the high-profile and other cases unveiling cor-
ruption scams in the media disappear from sight unresolved, and the public percep-
tion of corruption has worsened in the last few years. The European Commission 
thus concluded that until the year 2007 there was not even one successful judicial 
prosecution of a high-profile case, and such a statement was merely copied in next 
year’s Progress Report.
As a result of such criticism, in June 2008 a revised anti-corruption strategy 
was adopted with a pertinent action plan encompassing special measures for wid-
er areas exposed to corruption. In the 2008 Progress Report, the European Com-
mission established that the legal framework for the fight against corruption was 
changed, alongside with additions to the Criminal Act and complements to the Law 
on the Conflict of Interest. This was assessed as a good progress, but the principle of 
the conflict of interest was assessed as not clear enough at all levels of political de-
cision-making. Although the new Law on Financing Political Parties became ope-
rational, the most important question of election campaigns financing has not been 
solved completely. In contrast with the previous Progress Report, the 2008 Report 
added that a “culture of political accountability is lacking”.
Moreover, the 2009 Progress Report stated that “corruption remains omnipre-
sent”. The findings from last year were confirmed, saying that a limited investiga-
tion of corruption at the high level was started, but it was obstacled for political rea-
sons – and the culture of political accountability was still lacking. A discouraging 
formulation was used, reflecting summarily the objective and equally discouraging 
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situation: “A serious implementation of anti-corruption procedures on the part of 
state administration is lacking, while many political bodies support the centrally 
coordinated anti-corruption effort only in words” (EU Enlargement: Croatia 2009 
Progress Report).
Although the complements to the Criminal Law introduced new regulations 
concerning the confiscation of property in case of corruption, no such cases oc-
curred, and therefore an evaluation of these measures could not be done. Corrup-
tion is still “omnipresent”. Public procurement was cited as a special source of cor-
ruption, and besides this, the Law on the Right of Access to Data has not yet been 
implemented and has not shown any positive result. Still the problem of a lacking 
culture regarding corruption is underlined.
All of this resulted in a revised Action Plan accompanying the Strategy for 
Combating Corruption, approved on March 18, 2010. This Action Plan announced 
“general zero-rate tolerance of corruption”, as Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor an-
nounced on the same day at the meeting of the Cabinet. The Action Plan enumerates 
145 measures which encompass, as stated in the introduction, an “integral (compre-
hensive, all-encompassing) approach to prevent and fight corruption”. For this rea-
son, the “strategic vision of the fight against corruption” is evidentiated through five 
thematic areas on which the Government focused its activities: legal and institutional 
framework, prevention of corruption, legal prosecution and sanctioning of corrup-
tion, international cooperation, and dissemination of public awareness on the da-
maging effects and harmfulness of corruption. The authors of the document are con-
vinced that zero-rate tolerance of corruption can be achieved by reaching a synergy 
of activities and energies in all these areas, thus achieving visible and tangible results 
that can be measured. On that occasion, Minister of Justice Ivan Šimonović stressed 
that the Action Plan has been developed and improved in cooperation with the Euro-
pean Commission. According to Šimonović, the expert group of the European Com-
mission rated the progress achieved as “very big” (Antikorupcija, 2010).
Nonetheless, the European Commission requested that the anti-corruption 
fight in Croatia be made more efficient, taking into consideration also the future EU 
funds that Croatia would be receiving after its accession, which makes the need for 
a tougher fight against corruption more compelling.
4. The Problem of the Lack of a Comprehensive Conception 
of Political Corruption in Croatia
However, a fundamental question imposes itself: if an “integral approach to fight 
corruption” is necessary, why is such an approach still lacking? A partial answer to 
the question can be derived from the approach to the corruption phenomenon. In the 
literature dealing with political corruption, the phenomenon of “double awareness” 
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regarding corruption is well-known. Such a “double awareness” is characterized by 
a denial of existence of political corruption as an “integral phenomenon”, and by its 
reduction to some of its elements: on the one hand, “petty corruption” and “street-
-level corruption”, and, on the other hand, business corruption or corruption in deal-
ings between privately-owned enterprises. A similar approach is at work in Croatia 
as well (Heidenheimaer, 1978; de Leon, 1993).
For this reason, we will attempt to found our analysis of the “double aware-
ness” phenomenon on the example of the anti-corruption strategy in Croatia, and, 
in particular, on definition of political corruption. Is corruption in privately-owned 
enterprises – when a company (or part of its management) bribes another part of the 
management (or an individual manager) – really a form of political corruption? Al-
so, is “petty” or “street-level” corruption really a form of political corruption? In the 
first instance, where a company is bribed, and the corruptor is a corporation, while 
the corrupted is the management of another company or an individual manager of 
another company, who makes a decision in favour of the corruptor/company moti-
vated by his own advantage or interest, one really cannot speak of political corrup-
tion. Here the decision of the corrupted party, influenced by the corruption transac-
tion, causes damage to his own company, i.e. its owners. If this is a privately-owned 
or joint stock company, the owners are the injured party, and this form of corruption 
can be categorized as corporate crime. In the second case, if the “petty” corruption is 
a transaction between the corruptor/private entrepreneur and the corrupted/service-
-provider, who is also a private entrepreneur, this is an equally private transaction. 
In both cases, the market does not function properly and corruption is performed in 
the form of classic bribery, i.e. of financial or gift transactions made before or after 
the expected service or favourable decision. In both cases, the private-law relation is 
violated, and this may also be cause for legal sanctions against the participants.
But things are radically different if one of the participants of the corruption 
process, in either of the two cases, is a public figure or a representative of a public 
institution. Then we are indeed dealing with political corruption. It must be noted 
here that definitions of corruption are not static. Society’s perception of what can be 
termed “corruptedness” evolves. In times, societies started to distinguish between 
“bribery” and permissible “reciprocity” or “transaction”. Similar categories apply 
to political corruption. The more a society is democratic and developed, the more 
the concept of political corruption is extended to include every form of corruption 
which has social consequences reflected in the quality of the political process, in the 
system of values and in the political culture of this particular society.
Be that as it may, political corruption is a phenomenon which requires a com-
plex description and categorization, and a composite definition. If we take a look 
at some of the principal definitions of political corruption, we see that the corre-
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sponding transaction necessarily involves at least one protagonist who is a holder 
of some public role. For instance, Joseph S. Ney defines political corruption as be-
haviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
-regarding (personal, close family, tribe, clan, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain private-regarding influence. 
John T. Noonan makes no distinction between “public” (i.e. political) and “private” 
(i.e. business) corruption: in his judgement, corruption is historically related either 
to political or sexual behaviour. Similarly to the Latin word corruptio, it is associ-
ated with a wide range of manifestations of evil. Corruption designates that which 
destroys the whole, which undermines and endangers the human community. Do-
natella della Porta defines corruption as the offer of direct of indirect pecuniary gain 
or other non-material services which are not the result of an official’s regular work, 
and which the official uses for satisfaction of his personal needs or the needs of oth-
ers, being incited thereby to act contrary to his powers, or to behave or not behave 
in the appropriate manner. Susan Rose Ackerman distinguishes between economic 
and political corruption, but does not wish to set standards for a definition of cor-
ruption, because such a definition depends on the political and corporate culture and 
tradition of a country. Accordingly, that which, in a particular country, is considered 
corruption, is, in another country, perceived as an acceptable form of social beha-
viour. Ultimately, however, she also comes to the conclusion that corruption – be it 
economic or political – represents a danger to democracy and the democratic func-
tioning of the government (Grubiša, 2005).
As opposed to the above distinctions in the works of corruption theorists, much 
more pragmatic definitions result from the need to find international instruments for 
fighting corruption. Thus the OECD (1994), approaching it from the standpoint of 
economic activity, defines corruption as an activity which involves the offer of il-
licit financial or other benefits to a public official in order to incite him to violate 
his official duties in order to achieve some goal or maintain a business relation. 
The Council of Europe states that corruption (any corruption, be it business or po-
litical) poses a serious threat to the basic principles of democracy, undermines the 
citizens’ trust of democracy, endangers the rule of law, represents the negation of 
human rights, and jeopardizes the social and economic progress. Transparency In-
ternational defines corruption as abuse of entrusted power for private gain or for the 
gain of some political group by a public office holder, a politician or a civil servant. 
Or, in simpler terms, corruption is the abuse of political power for private benefit. 
It encompasses the behaviour of office holders in the public sector on the basis of 
which they enrich themselves or persons close to them contrary to regulations and 
illegally, and they do so by misuse of entrusted public power. Transparency Interna-
tional distinguishes between various forms of corruption: political, administrative 
and business corruption. In the view of the European Union, corruption refers to 
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any misuse of power or irregularity in the decision-making process, which is com-
mitted for illicit gain or as a result of inducement (Grubiša, 2005).
We could quote many more definitions which speak in favour of dividing cor-
ruption into economic (corporate, i.e. business) corruption and political corruption, 
as well as definitions in favour of identifying corruption as an eminently political 
phenomenon. According to the latter group of definitions, every corruption is po-
litical corruption, even when it involves private subjects, since the effect of their 
transaction has social and therefore also political implications. But this distinction 
between corruption forms is beside the point. The important thing is to identify the 
forms of political corruption, for we will find through this identification that every 
corruption is political in its implications.
5. Forms of Political Corruption
In order to gain an “integral approach to corruption”, we must also analyze the 
forms of political and other corruption. The most frequent form of corruption en-
countered by societies is bribery. Bribery is a transaction between at least two par-
ticipants, in which one is the bribe giver, and the other the bribe receiver. The bribe-
-giving act itself is also called active bribery, which includes the giving, promising 
or offering, directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage to any public official, for 
himself or for anyone else, for him to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of 
his duties. Passive bribery is defined (e.g. in the Criminal Law Convention on Cor-
ruption of the Council of Europe) as the request or receipt by any public official, 
directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or for anyone else, or the 
acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from act-
ing in the exercise of his duties. Bribery belongs to the type of “petty” or “street-
-level” corruption, although it can assume very large proportions, in the financial 
and material sense. Graft falls into the same category as bribery; unlike the latter, 
which includes the intention to influence someone in order to fulfil some personal 
or group interest, which is quite difficult to prove, graft or undeserved gain is a one-
-sided transaction made in expectation of a return favour within the recipients pow-
ers or of his better performance, or else a reward for a previously performed service 
within the scope of one’s official duty and special discretionary right (e.g. in the 
public health service, to perform an operation on a patient before the expiry of the 
usual waiting period). Graft is visible in cases when a politician uses the informa-
tion on an intended conversion of a piece of land, e.g. for construction purposes, in 
such a way as to purchase the land himself or enable another person to purchase it 
before the information is made available to the general public. Such a form of cor-
ruption is also called shirini – after the Persian word for a “sweet”, which, in the 
Persian Empire, was a euphemism for bribes.
Politička misao, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2010, pp. 69-95
84
But there are other, more sophisticated forms of political corruption, in which 
the transaction is not visible, nor is it so easily noticeable, and it even cannot be 
quantified. One of these forms, more visible than others in this category, is nepotism 
– employing or favouring relatives, acquaintances or members of some more exclu-
sive informal group. An instance of this is the case of “uncle Luka”, President of the 
Croatian Parliament Luka Bebić, who was expected to hire “fellow-countrymen” to 
leading managerial positions in public companies. When the corrupt transaction is 
made for the benefit of some formal group, we are dealing with cronyism – undue 
advantage gained on the basis of participation to a political group, i.e. a political 
party or clique, interest group or network. An instance of this is the employment of 
Rade Buljubašić, upon his return from emigration, by former Prime Minister Ivo 
Sanader, who was also president of the Croatian Democratic Union: Buljubašić was 
a salaried employee of the Croatian Electrical Utility, but in truth he worked at the 
HDZ headquarters. This category also comprises political appointment of officials 
according to the spoils system, i.e. when the winner in the political elections gives 
a number of positions in public administration to his followers regardless of their 
qualifications (e.g. the appointment of Neven Jurica, poet and member of HDZ, 
to the office of ambassador, although he was formally not qualified for the office, 
which had the catastrophic effect of use of state funds for his personal needs, as 
confirmed by the fact that he was found guilty by the Municipal Court in Zagreb for 
misuse of public funds). This form of corruption is also called clientelism – from the 
Latin concept cliens, designating a citizen who was compelled by his unfavourable 
position in society to resort to the support of a patronus (protector or patron) in re-
turn for various favours, including his vote in the elections. Accordingly, patronage 
is a distinct form of political corruption, in which the patronus, patron or protector 
supports his “clients” and gives them certain positions in society (as in the examples 
of Luka Bebić, Ivo Sanader, et al.) based on their loyalty to the party, or party lead-
ership, regardless of their actual abilities and often in spite of their incompetence. In 
this way supporters and followers of the regime are created, be it in individual cases 
or in cases of support to entire segments of the population (for instance, the voters 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Croatian elections, or the privileged treatment 
of the category of fake homeland war participants, who are mobilized as supporters 
of a political option or leadership).
In addition to the forms of political corruption discussed above, there are clas-
sic forms of political corruption such as embezzlement, i.e. theft of entrusted public 
funds or redirection thereof to areas located in the “twilight zone”. A fitting example 
is the case of HNS (Croatian People’s Party) official Srećko Ferenčak and his part-
ner, who sold the piece of land entrusted to them by the City of Zagreb for humani-
tarian purposes on the market at the full market-based price. Furthermore, there are 
kickbacks – on the fringe of legality (e.g. in the form of donations for humanitarian 
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or educational purposes, given in return for government intervention, i.e. for inter-
vention of an individual minister, for favouritism in public competitions, for state 
support) and other forms of so-called political lobbying.
Undoubtedly the most evasive form of corruptive transaction, however, is so-
-called influence peddling, i.e. trading in political influence. Influence peddling is 
the illegal practice of using someone’s influence in the government or in public af-
fairs, or connections with government members, in order to obtain services or pre-
ferential treatment for someone else, usually not connected with the final outcome 
of payment, i.e. material compensation. Such a form of political corruption is also 
referred to as trading in influence. OECD termed it “undue influence peddling”, 
as a synonym for illegal forms of political lobbying – for instance, when Croatian 
city or county officials lobby government officials to have the highway route pass 
through their region, counting on an increase in the price of land and acting in con-
sort with possible investors who purchased the terrain in advance (a fine illustration 
is the case of Pelješac Bridge: a privately-owned company bought at a low price 
the rocky terrain at Pelješac on which, as was subsequently decided, the Pelješac 
Bridge would be built).
Another form of political corruption is extortion, as unlawful and intentio-
nal obtainment of an advantage, material or non-material, from another person or 
subject, by imposing illegal pressure in the form of threat or intimidation in order 
to force them to provide certain benefits. Such coercion can include physical injury, 
violence or hindrance, and even involve endangering of a third party (e.g. the case 
of Igor Rađenović, head of Zagreb City Holding; see p. 90).
In some political systems, where the legislators’ autonomy with regard to their 
political parties is guaranteed by the majority election system, one more form of 
political corruption is manifest, namely logrolling or trading of favours, a genuine 
quid pro quo, such as vote selling or trading in order to obtain passage of one’s own 
proposed law or measure in return for a similar favour. This form of political cor-
ruption also has an “academic” variant, namely cross-quoting by authors of scien-
tific works in order to drive up reference counts in scientific publications.
Finally, the classic form of political corruption is the conflict of interest, i.e. 
the mixing of public and private interests in performing one or two duties or func-
tions. The way of resolving the conflict of interest of public office-holders is crucial 
to the functioning of public duty bearers. Due to the lack of regulations on preven-
tion and resolution of conflicts of interest, there were cases of state officials – mini-
sters – who confided the managing positions in their own, private enterprises to 
their wives or relatives while they performed a public function (fitting examples 
from Ivica Račan’s 2000-2003 coalition government were ministers and officials 
Goranko Fižulić, Radimir Čačić and Zlatko Tomčić, while the previous, 1990s pe-
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riod provided countless examples). In developed democratic societies, any partici-
pation of a public official (minister or state secretary) in the management of a public 
enterprise is also considered a conflict of interest. The French People’s Assembly 
solved this issue back in 1935 by prohibiting representatives and ministers from en-
tering into such engagement.
All the forms of political corruption discussed above testify to the fact that po-
litical corruption cannot be reduced only to one or two of its forms. Its evasiveness, 
its appearance in occult and non-transparent modes is due precisely to it being a 
complex phenomenon, irreducible to one or two forms. And this is exactly what is 
going on in the Croatian case. 
With persistence equal to that of the European Commission’s request for “full 
understanding of political corruption”, the Croatian political and legislative practice 
reduces political corruption only to its most visible forms: bribery and, possibly, 
graft. Still, many graft-related affairs remain unsolved (for instance, the collection 
of precious watches of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader). Therefore, it is obvi-
ously not enough, in the legislative aspect of the fight against corruption, to enact 
provisions regarding misuse of public duty, conflict of interest, right to public infor-
mation, and to make transparent the procedure of public procurement. It is also ne-
cessary to call political corruption by its right name in legal regulation and enumer-
ate all its forms with corresponding measures and sanctions. In short, it is necessary 
to enact genuine anti-corruption legislation, thereby increasing public awareness of 
political corruption and creating prerequisites for efficient, all-embracing political 
action against corruption. For this reason, we must, first of all, analyse the short-
comings of the existing legal regulation regarding corruption in Croatia.
6. Legal Definitions of Corruption and Legal Instruments 
against Corruption in Croatia
The starting thesis in the analysis of shortcomings of the existing legal regulation 
regarding corruption in Croatia can be expressed by the evaluation that here too 
we encounter a reduction of political corruption to only one, most visible form 
of corruption. Suffice it to take into consideration only three publications which 
should reflect the “state of the arts” in the field of legal thought: firstly, the Le-
gal Lexicon by Marta Vidaković Mukić, Supreme Court judge (Vidaković Mukić, 
2006); secondly, the Legal Lexicon of “Miroslav Krleža” Lexicographic Institute 
(ed. by Vladimir Pezo) (Pezo, 2006); and, thirdly, the Dictionary of Criminal Law 
by Željko Horvatić, author of the Croatian Criminal Code (Horvatić, 2002). None 
of the three publications defines specifically the concept of political corruption, 
but some of the elements of which it consists are defined within the scope of the 
general concept of “corruption”. For example, Horvatić holds that corruption is an 
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undesirable social phenomenon which causes a weakening of the citizens’ trust in 
the work of the administration and in the laws and authorities. He points out that 
corruption is as old as state organization of human communities, and that it is a his-
torical, traditional, psychological, sociological, economic, political, legal, national 
and international phenomenon and problem, but there is still no accord regarding a 
universally accepted definition of contemporary corruption. Thus, Horvatić identi-
fies the all-embracing concept of corruption with political corruption. In his judge-
ment, only the essential determinants of the concept are indisputable, and they are 
mainly reduced to exerting illicit forms of influence in the performance of state, 
public, economic and other duties and functions with the purpose of obtaining cer-
tain material advantages or gains. Such conduct, contrary to the office and to public 
interest, endangers the functioning of the rule of law principle, which is manifest as 
equality of all before the law, and the foundations of functioning of the legal state. 
Consequently, corruption impedes lawful conduct in all fields of social activity and 
causes destruction of trust in the existence of a legal and social (sic!) state.
We must also stress here that the request for a legal state is an eminently po-
litical question. The European Union recognized this fact and categorized the legal 
state realization as a political rather than a legal criterion. Therefore, when Horvatić 
speaks of endangerment of the legal state, we are dealing with a political phenome-
non. And this is precisely what Horvatić goes on to assert in the lexicographic entry 
on corruption: the broadest definition of the corruption concept states that it covers 
any misuse of public powers for personal advantage of a person holding a public of-
fice. Furthermore, Horvatić claims that corruption is a generic concept for a series 
of corrupt criminal acts in contemporary criminal legislation (at this point the defi-
nitions starts to move in circles). On the other hand, however, he correctly asserts 
that corruption is “closely related to the concept of conflict of interest in the per-
formance of public duties”, and opposition to corruption in contemporary politics 
(sic!) faces numerous difficulties, even resistance, as a result of traditional views in 
some milieus and social communities as to what is and what is not to be considered 
criminal corruption.
Horvatić seeks to perceive corruption as a “criminal activity”, which is why he 
must acknowledge that particular difficulties in achieving effective results through 
the policy of suppressing criminal corruption stem from the general and particular, 
personal and social, endogenous and exogenous causes for corruption, and from 
the circumstance that, in most criminal acts of corruption, it is hard to identify the 
specific injured person. This is so because the victims are quite frequently numer-
ous and individually unnamed members of social communities, whose rights and 
freedoms are directly or indirectly endangered or violated by a criminal act of cor-
ruption. Horvatić’s acknowledgement that there are occult aspects of corruption and 
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that, at the same time, it is necessary to identify a criminal act of corruption, is the 
best indication of the difficulty which arises when one tries to reduce political cor-
ruption only to an act of corruption in classic criminal legislation.
Consequently, Horvatić finds it important to determine the various criminal 
acts of corruption. Since he fails to grasp the occult nature of corruption, the easiest 
way for him to proceed is to reduce it to criminal acts which he defines as misuse of 
the performance of duties by state authorities, described in Article 338 of the Crimi-
nal Code of the Republic of Croatia, unlawful mediation, described in Article 343 
of the Criminal Code, as well as giving and receiving of bribery (Articles 347 and 
348 of the Criminal Code). Naturally, in addition to the above-mentioned criminal 
acts, corruption as bribery, i.e. other forms of illicit influence to obtain personal ad-
vantage, occurs also in other criminal acts, such as infringement of free deliberation 
of voters (Article 116 of the Criminal Code), infringement of equality in perform-
ing economic activity (Article 280), abuse in bankruptcy proceedings (Article 283), 
disloyal competition in foreign-trade business transactions (Article 289), and the il-
licit disclosure or procurement of trade secrets.
A similar reductionism is present in Marta Vidaković Mukić’s definition of 
corruption (again the concept of political corruption is missing). In her judgement, 
corruption is the occurrence of corruptibility (bribe receiving) in a particular society 
and, when there is widespread corruption of the state apparatus, a fusion of the lat-
ter with crime is possible, which is especially dangerous for the survival of society 
itself. While Horvatić offered his definition of corruption in 2002, Marta Vidaković 
Mukić wrote on the subject in 2006, i.e. at the time when it was already clear that 
the issue of political corruption – or, as stressed by the Report of the European 
Commission on Croatia’s progress, corruption “at high political levels” – was the 
main problem. She also reduces corruption to criminal-law provisions in Article 
347 of the Criminal Code, which sanctions passive bribery – this stipulates sanc-
tions against any official or responsible person who requests or accepts a gift or any 
advantage, or who accepts the promise of a gift or any advantage in return for per-
forming an official or some other activity, within the limits of his powers, which he 
should not perform, or for not performing an official or some other activity which it 
is his duty to perform, while Article 348 stipulates sanctions against active bribery. 
According to M. Vidaković Mukić, criminal-law prevention of corruption also in-
cludes incriminations from Article 337, which define the abuse of position and au-
thority, while corruption also comprises the act of misuse of state and government 
duty (Article 338 of the Criminal Code). She concludes that the latter is a new cri-
minal act in our criminal legislation, committed by an official or responsible person 
when he uses his position or his authority to influence competitions and allocate, 
take over or arrange business deals in order to obtain material gain for his family 
members in his private activity.
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A somewhat broader definition of corruption is offered in the Legal Lexicon 
of the Lexicographic Institute. Corruption is defined as violation of public duties, 
and even mere willingness to violate them for the sake of personal interests and ad-
vantages. It is stated that corruption is more or less present in all societies and cul-
tures, but in different forms. Where shortcomings in the operation of the system’s 
institutions are more pronounced, individual or street-level corruption occurs more 
frequently as a means of overcoming those shortcomings (i.e. as a means of sur-
vival). An instance of this is the attempt to influence the lower levels of state ad-
ministration in order to effectuate certain rights and interests which cannot be met 
due to the inefficiency of the system itself. In societies in which the functioning of 
the system’s institutions is satisfactory, the need for individual corruption is signifi-
cantly reduced, but this does not remove causes of other forms of corruption, e.g. of 
mediated corruption, as a “phenomenon close to the mode of activity of the politi-
cal elite, whereby it gains direct or indirect personal and/or political advantages”. 
In a somewhat broader interpretation, the Legal Lexicon approaches corruption as 
a general social problem, which pertains to criminal law only a posteriori. Ac-
cordingly, with regard to preventing and limiting corruption in a society, the legal 
mechanisms must be used together with other anti-corruption, multidisciplinary in-
struments, with legal regulation of the conflict of interest, with the activity of non-
-governmental organisations, and with detection through the media.
Even the Legal Lexicon, however, fails to define the concept of political cor-
ruption, and, consequently, does not grasp the occult forms of political corruption 
which, being more difficult to detect and to subject to criminal-law sanctions, evade 
superficial observation, and thus represent a more serious threat to the functioning 
of democratic society.
7. The Need for Unified Legal Instruments for Preventing and Fighting 
Corruption in Croatia with regard to Prospective EU Membership
The interpretations discussed above clearly show that the concepts of corruption 
and political corruption are easily confused, and that the “corruption” concept is at 
times used as a synonym to business corruption, at other times as a synonym to pri-
vate (street-level) corruption, and at still other times as a synonym to political cor-
ruption. Such a conceptual confusion is then reflected in legal reductionism, which 
fails to grasp the complex nature of the phenomenon. Consequently, the Croatian 
anti-corruption policy remains limited to the criminal-law reduction of misuse of 
public office and cannot accede “corruption on a high political level”, which the Eu-
ropean Commission is talking about. The only way to make the fight against politi-
cal corruption (i.e. corruption in general) more efficient is to unify the existing legal 
instruments against corruption, and to issue new regulations, which would also ex-
pressis verbis encompass sanctions against the occult forms of corruption.
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Thus, the existing provisions of the Criminal Code, the Law on Criminal Pro-
cedure, the Law on Preventing Conflict of Interest, the provisions of the Law on 
Public Procurement, the Law on Financing Political Parties, Independent Lists and 
Candidates, and the provisions of the Law on the Right to Access Information, 
should all be unified, and, together with new provisions, they should formulate a 
new, modern “Law on Preventing and Fighting Political Corruption”, befitting 
the actual time and society, which would encompass all as yet unmentioned forms 
of political corruption that are usually reduced to misuse of public office. The mere 
mention of forms of political corruption such as nepotism, cronyism, patronage and 
political lobbying, along with all other existing forms of corruption mentioned in 
the other laws, would create a completely different climate and mobilize the entire 
society for prevention and fighting of political corruption. Such a law would also 
have to include provisions on the protection of whistle-blowers and all those who 
denounce political corruption. This would protect both the media and the media 
workers who, through denunciation of political corruption and organised crime, 
are exposed even to mortal danger or repression (e.g. the murder of Ivo Pukanić, 
owner of the periodical “Nacional”; the beating up of journalist Dušan Miljuš, who 
unveiled individual corruption affairs, and of Igor Rađenović, head of Zagreb City 
Holding, who initiated the process of unveiling corruption connections and conflict 
of interest within his own company; the firing of journalist Jasna Babić, who fo-
cuses on crime and corruption; the media persecution of journalist Duško Petričić, 
who wrote the book “Crime in Croatian Privatization”, etc.).
Accordingly, in conclusion, we advocate an all-embracing approach to the con-
cept of political corruption in legal instruments, and the making of a legal mecha-
nism which would explicitly point at political corruption, with no juggling with the 
ambivalence of the corruption concept. Until this is done, we will not be able to 
free ourselves from the impression that there is a major gap between the declarative 
willingness of our politicians (e.g. Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor and Minister of 
Justice Ivan Šimonović) to deal radically with political corruption, and the actual 
evading of an integral approach to political corruption by reducing the efforts only 
to some elements of criminal-law prosecution. Therefore, a solution to political 
corruption cannot possibly be found solely in the sphere of limited legal regulation, 
which is mostly formulated only by legal experts who do not and cannot understand 
the essence of political corruption (naturally, with the exception of legal theorist and 
law sociologist Josip Kregar). This problem can be solved only in synergy with po-
litical science and political scientists. Dogmatic lawyers and the classic, traditional 
legal science are interested in the competences and the functioning of political insti-
tutions, while political science penetrates the very essence of the power of political 
institutions, and has a better understanding of the pathology of the political system. 
A reduction of political corruption to the functioning of institutions and the abuse 
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of a public office does not make it possible to comprehend the deformations created 
by the informal and invisible transactions of political power. In the absence of such 
a synergy, in which legal regulations are complemented by research into political 
corruption as a comprehensive educational initiative covering important segments 
of the population (for instance, scientific inquiry into political corruption in Croatia 
is limited to several individuals, and only last year, as part of the Bologna Process, 
has political corruption been introduced as a separate course entitled “Comparative 
Political Corruption” at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb), Croatia will 
once again languish among the countries with an estimated high level of corruption, 
and its political elite will continue to behave in accordance with the maxim of the 
Prince of Salina from Tommasi’s The Leopard: “We will change everything, so that 
everything remains the same”.
8. Epilogue: Expansion and Concretization of Benchmarks for the 
Finalization of Negotiations on EU Membership of Croatia
The long-lasting EU accession negotiations with Croatia resulted in a new, third ge-
neration of conditionality principles with regard to membership, also referred to as 
benchmarks. The experience and practice of these negotiations will be instructive to 
other countries in the region aspiring to EU membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. The Croatian experience shows that the fight 
against corruption ranks high on the list of EU priorities at the time of both open-
ing and closing negotiations. By June 2010, Croatia negotiated the closing of 29 of 
the 33 negotiation chapters which it received (four more than the transition coun-
tries from Central and East Europe). On June 25, 2010 the remaining three chapters 
were opened: market competition, foreign policy and judiciary. Precisely the judici-
ary chapter is crucial, for it encompasses benchmarks which contain, inter alia, the 
fight against corruption. The launching of an anti-corruption program and strategy 
had been one of the benchmarks for preparation and opening of negotiations in the 
field of the judiciary, but now, obviously tired of long negotiations, the European 
Commission, prompted by the member-states, decided to formulate the final bench-
marks which it transformed from the form of opening benchmarks into the form of 
closure benchmarks. In this way, an impression has been created that the negotia-
tions gained in speed, but the ultimate effect will be the same – the benchmarks 
must be fulfilled, regardless of whether they are termed negotiation-opening or fi-
nal negotiation-closing benchmarks. This time the European Commission and the 
intergovernmental negotiating team have opted for an integral, systemic approach 
to the sphere of political corruption, although the benchmarks have seemingly been 
formulated in quite a neutral way. But the indicators of fulfilment thereof will be 
absolutely concrete and, if consistently implemented, they will have to perform the 
function of catalysts for the launching of a more systematic anti-corruption fight in 
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Croatian society. For this reason, we will conclude this discussion by listing taxo-
nomically the 21 benchmarks, which clearly demonstrate the extent to which politi-
cal corruption is not only an endemic, but even a systemic affliction of the Croatian 
society and politics. This is confirmed by the following benchmarks: 
1 – to ensure the capacities for conducting the judicial reform
2 – to establish and keep records of appointment of judicial staff
3 – to reform and strengthen the State Judicial Council and the State Prosecu-
torial Council
4 – to significantly reduce the judicial backlog
5 – to computerize the courts and the system of allocation of cases to individual 
judges
6 – to rationalize the network of courts
7 – to keep records of results of war crimes trials
8 – to revise cases and to guarantee adequate treatment in renewal of legal pro-
ceedings
9 – to strengthen USKOK – Office for Combating Corruption and Organized 
Crime and to expand its powers
10 – to improve the efficiency and depolitization of the police
11 – to increase the capacity of courts, technically and in human resources
12 – to increase the transparency and integrity of public administration
13 – to improve regulations on political-party financing
14 – to control the assets cards of office-holders and judges
15 – to increase the employment of minorities, especially in the police and the 
judiciary
16 – to conduct research into under-representation of minorities in the wider 
public sector
17 – to take measures aimed at reconciliation and increased tolerance among 
citizens
18 – to finalize the solving of the housing issue of refugees, former property 
owners
19 – to improve the processing of appeals regarding house reconstruction
20 – to improve the administrative judicature
21 – to keep records of achieved results in fighting discrimination and to 
strengthen the Office of the Ombudsman.
(Source: Večernji list, July 19, 2010)
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This taxonomic enumeration of benchmarks clearly shows that political cor-
ruption has gained access into each of the above-listed activities. For this reason, 
euphemistically speaking (in fact, in diluted, diplomatic terminology), what is re-
quested is “improvement”, “strengthening” and “keeping record” of thus far lacking 
actions. And the general benchmark, which was the precondition for opening ne-
gotiations regarding (but not only) the judiciary, retains the form of anti-corruption 
strategy and the finalization of its implementation. The final assessment thereof will 
have to be made by the European Commission and the intergovernmental confe-
rence immediately preceding the conclusion of the negotiations.
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